The subprime mortgage market: national and Twelfth District developments by Fred Furlong & John Krainer
Introduction 
I
n 2007, the term “subprime mortgage” became 
a  household  word.  The  subprime  market  in 
the U.S. had grown remarkably over the past 
decade, contributing to a rise in homeowner-
ship rates. However, it took the sharp increase in de-
linquencies and foreclosures in 2006 and 2007 for 
the subprime market to capture the public spotlight. 
Indeed, the sudden shift in fortunes in the subprime 
market appeared to catch borrowers and lenders off 
guard. In addition, the spillovers from the subprime 
meltdown reached deep into financial markets, caus-
ing substantial turmoil in the U.S. and abroad. 
This report examines the developments in sub-
prime  financing  to  help  understand  the  factors   
behind the sudden and substantial deterioration in 
the subprime market, as well as the reasons for the 
extensive impact on broader financial markets. The 
report highlights the experience in the Twelfth Dis-
trict,  which  has  regions  with  some  of  the  highest   
concentrations of subprime lending. 
This report argues that much of the growth and 
success of the subprime market in the first part of the 
decade was built on the rise in house prices and the 
easing of underwriting standards, along with the use 
of innovations in financing. The reversal in housing 
market conditions quickly unmasked the vulnerability 
of the subprime market, as softening house prices in 
many markets greatly reduced the ability, as well as 
the willingness, of some borrowers to keep mortgage 
payments current. In addition, the turmoil that erupted 
in  financial  markets  was  due  to  the  widespread 
distribution of exposure to subprime debt, as well as 
more general doubts that arose concerning the value 
of complex financial arrangements used to finance 
subprime mortgages and other credit.
What is “subprime”?
There is no one definition of a subprime mort-
gage.  The  classification  “subprime”  generally  is  a 
lender-given designation for loans extended to bor-
rowers with some sort of credit impairment, say, due 
to missing installment payments on debt or the lack 
of a credit history.1 The industry sometimes lumps 
subprime loans into the general class of nonprime 
loans, which also includes the so-called alt-A loans. 
Borrowers  who  receive  alt-A  loans  generally  have 
higher credit ratings than subprime borrowers, but the 
loans are viewed as nonprime because of some spe-
cific feature of the loan arrangement, such as limited 
or no documentation about income or assets, high 
loan-to-value ratios, high payment-to-income ratios, 
the purchase of a second home, or some combination 
of these characteristics (see Box 1).2 
1  See Souphala Chomsisengphet and Anthony Pennington-Cross, “The Evolution of the Subprime Mortgage Market,” Federal Reserve Bank 
of St. Louis Review (January 2006), for a discussion of the development of subprime mortgage lending in the U.S. 
www.research.stlouisfed.org/publications/review/06/01/ChomPennCross.pdf
2 Fair Issac Company (FICO) credit scores are one metric of the overall risk of borrowers. FICO scores range from 300 to 850, with subprime gen-
erally assumed to be below the 620 to 660 range. Based on First American LoanPerformance (FALP) data for September 2007, FICO scores av-
eraged 705 for alt-A borrowers and 617 for subprime borrowers for the U.S. The figures for the Twelfth District are 709 and 635, respectively. 
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interest rates. Interest rates on adjustable rate mortgages 
(ARMs) are pegged to a benchmark rate, such as the six-
month Libor rate3 or the one-year Treasury bill rate. As of 
September 2007, for a sample of outstanding subprime 
loans assembled by First American LoanPerformance 
(FALP),  the  spread  over  various  benchmark  rates 
averaged about 4 percentage points (see Box 2).
A feature of many subprime ARMs is a lower initial 
rate that is fixed for a period of time before resetting 
to the indexed rate. For example, the popular 2/28 
ARMs reset to the fully indexed interest rate after the 
first two years. While initial rates on many subprime 
ARMs are lower than the reset rate, these initial rates 
are notably higher than prime mortgage rates. The typi-
cal subprime ARM in the FALP data set as of September 
2007 had an initial rate of 8.0 percent, well above the 
conventional 30-year fixed rate of about 6.2 percent 
over the period in which the loans were originated. 
Anecdotally, many subprime loans are not intend-
ed as long-term financing for houses. Instead, sub-
prime loans are often viewed as a first step for certain 
borrowers who want to buy a house but do not have 
a sufficiently large down payment or a good enough 
credit history to qualify for prime (or even alt-A) fi-
nancing. Indeed, subprime ARMs are often described 
as bridge loans to more permanent financing. With a 
bridge loan, the borrower has a chance to build a re-
payment history, build equity in the house, and even-
tually move (refinance) into a lower-priced mortgage. 
Historically, subprime borrowers who are not able to 
refinance into new loans tend to have relatively high 
loan default rates and often face foreclosures or are 
forced to find other ways to terminate their mortgage 
3 London interbank offered rate
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Box 1: Alt-A versus  
            subprime mortgages
Compared with subprime borrowers, alt-A 
borrowers tend to have higher credit ratings. 
At the same time, the alt-A classification 
tends to be associated with loans having more 
unconventional terms.  These include interest 
only loans and option-ARMs. As of September 
2007, an estimated 28 percent of all alt-A 
loans were interest-only, compared with 12 
percent for subprime. Nearly 16 percent of 
all alt-A loans included a provision allowing 
a borrower to choose among several payment 
options each month, while it was extremely 
rare for a subprime loan to contain this feature. 
On balance, alt-A loans are viewed as having 
lower risk and, thus, carry lower interest rates 
than subprime loans. Based on the FALP data 
for September 2007, mortgage rates among 
the sample of alt-A borrowers averaged about 
7 percent, compared with about 9 percent for 
subprime loans.   
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There is no one definition of a subprime mortgage. The classification 
“subprime” generally is a lender-given designation for loans extended 
to borrowers with some sort of credit impairment, say, due to missing 
installment payments on debt or the lack of a credit history.contracts, such as by selling their houses.4 Just like 
prime  borrowers,  many  subprime  borrowers  have   
refinanced to tap equity in their homes. 
Given  the  tendency  for  subprime  borrowers  to 
move out of their loans, at any point in time, outstand-
ing subprime loans tend to be of relatively recent vin-
tages. For example, as of September 2007, about 70 
percent of the outstanding subprime loans had been 
originated in 2005, 2006, or 2007. This share for the 
Twelfth District is even higher, at about 80 percent. 
The rise in subprime lending 
The  subprime  market  began  to  bloom  in  the 
late 1990s, and then picked up steam after the 2001 
recession (Figure 1). At the start of the current decade, 
subprime originations still only accounted for about   
6 percent of total residential mortgage originations. By 
2006, the subprime share of total mortgage originations 
had risen to about 25 percent. By one estimate, in late 
2007, the number of outstanding subprime mortgage 
loans totaled about 7¾ million, or 14 percent of the 
overall mortgage market.5
While the growth in subprime mortgage debt has 
been a national development, the regional importance 
of subprime mortgages varies considerably. Regional 
concentrations of subprime lending are reflected in 
Figure 2. These data are shares of total originations 
that  are  defined  as  higher-priced  mortgages  in  the 
data collected by the Federal Reserve under the Home 
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4 See Chomsisengphet and Pennington-Cross, “The Evolution of the Subprime Mortgage Market” (January 2006).
5  See remarks by Federal Reserve Governor Randall S. Kroszner at the Consumer Bankers Association 2007 Fair Lending Conference, 
Washington, D.C., “The Challenges Facing Subprime Mortgage Borrowers” (November 5, 2007).  
www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/speech/kroszner20071105a.htm#f2
Figure 1  
The surge in subprime 
































Box 2:  Sources of data on  
             subprime mortgages
Home Mortgage Disclosure Act 
Identifies mortgage loan originations as “higher-
priced” if the contract rate is greater than 3 
percentage points over the yield on an appropriate 
Treasury security. These data are collected by 
the Federal Reserve and released by the Federal 
Financial Institutions Examination Council (FFIEC).
Mortgage Bankers Association  
Reports loan performance based on a survey of  
its members. Loans are classified as subprime if  
the lender’s business is predominantly in the 
subprime category. 
Private sector data providers (First American 
LoanPerformance, McDash Analytics)  
Collect data from mortgage servicers on mortgage 
characteristics and loan performance. The 
subprime classification is determined by the 
mortgage originator.Mortgage Disclosure Act (HMDA) (see Box 2). These 
higher-priced  loans  likely  include  virtually  all  sub-
prime loans and a share of alt-A loans. The Twelfth 
District figures prominently in this map: some of the 
largest concentrations of higher-priced loans in the 
country are in the inland parts of California and the 
Las Vegas area, where the shares of mortgage loans 
originated  in  2006  that  were  higher-priced  ranged 
from about 35 percent to 40 percent, compared to the 
national average of around 25 percent. It is also worth 
noting that some of the communities with the lowest 
exposures to subprime lending also are in the Twelfth 
District, with the San Francisco and Seattle areas hav-
ing below-average higher-priced loan shares of about 
14 percent and 22 percent, respectively, in 2006.
The  rise  in  subprime  lending  occurred  within 
the context of an overall boom in housing and was 
greatly facilitated by innovations in housing finance.
The  housing  boom,  which  was  underway  in  the 
second  part  of  the  1990s  and  strengthened  further 
after 2001, was marked by strong growth in housing 
starts and a striking increase in homeownership rates. 
Even more striking was the rise in house prices, with   
double-digit gains in 2004 and into 2005 (red line, 
Figure 3). Some of the markets posting the most rapid 
house-price appreciation at the height of the housing 
boom were in the Twelfth District (Figure 4).
Seeds of the crisis
In the heady environment of seemingly relentless 
house-price appreciation in many markets, the growth 
in housing demand was accompanied by an increase 
in the supply of mortgage credit. Access to mortgage 
credit was made easier as underwriting standards on 
mortgage  debt  eased.  Looser  standards  included  a 
general increase in loan-to-value ratios, less stringent 
debt-to-income  requirements,  and  a  willingness  on 
the part of lenders to accept limited or no documenta-
tion of borrowers’ income and assets. 
The  expansion  of  subprime  credit,  and  perhaps 
even the loosening of credit standards, was facilitated 
by developments in asset-backed markets. Traditional 
“portfolio”  lending  involves  a  bank  originating 
and  holding  the  loan.  For  securitized  credit,  such 
as  the  issuance  of  residential  mortgage-backed 
securities  (RMBSs),  loans  are  purchased  from  firms 
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Figure 2   Some of the highest concentrations of subprime mortgage lending are in the Twelfth District
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Shares of Mortgage Originations That Are Higher-Priced among MSAs (2006)
30.8 to 51.3  27.6 to 30.8       25.2 to 27.6        21.9 to 25.2        9.8 to 21.9
Percent of Originations that are Subprime (2006)
Source: HMDA Data—Released by the FFIEC
MSAs = Metropolitan Statistical Areasoriginating  loans  (banks,  mortgage  companies,  and 
others) and then assembled into pools. These RMBSs, 
representing  claims  on  the  principal  and  interest 
payments made by borrowers on the loans in a pool, 
are then sold to investors. For years, the securitization 
of  residential  mortgages  was  dominated  by  the   
government–sponsored  enterprises  (GSEs),  Fannie 
Mae  and  Freddie  Mac,  which  primarily  securitized 
loans extended to higher quality borrowers who met 
legislative limits on loan size.
For the subprime market, sea change came with 
the growth in so-called private-label RMBSs issued by 
brokerage firms, banks, and even homebuilders, rath-
er than by the GSEs.6 Indeed, securitization, or the orig-
inate-to-distribute model, came to dominate subprime 
financing. As the volume of subprime mortgage origina-
tions grew over the past decade, the share of total sub-
prime financing through private-label RMBSs increased 
even faster, with the share rising from about 46 percent 
in 2001 to 75 percent in 2006. These subprime RMBSs 
found their way into the portfolios of a wide range of 
investors, including a number of large and not-so-large 
financial institutions in the U.S. and abroad. 
For many investors, exposures to subprime mort-
gages did not come from direct holdings of RMBSs, 
but rather through other types of asset-backed securi-
ties. For example, CDOs, or collateralized debt ob-
ligations, package multiple RMBSs (and other types 
of debt)—essentially securitizing several already secu-
ritized bundles of long-term debt instruments. Typi-
cally,  they  include  tranches—literally,  “slices”—of 
mortgage-backed securities with different exposures 
to risk based on a prioritization of the payments from 
the underlying mortgage securities, and are a type of 
“structured credit.” 
Another example is the structured investment vehi-
cle (SIV). A SIV is an ongoing, open-ended vehicle in 
the sense that new assets can be added to the vehicle 
over time, and the liabilities can be refinanced. A SIV 
typically is sponsored by a large financial institution, 
such as a bank, but is in fact a separate legal en-
tity. These SIVs invest in longer-term assets (including 
subprime-related debt) that are funded with combina-
tions of short-term and medium-term debt. 
In principle, the advantages of securitization are 
greater diversification and the spreading of risk, po-
tentially broadening access to credit and lowering its 
cost. However, the extent and incidence of risk may 
not always be clear in a world of complex financial 
arrangements. For some large financial institutions, 
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6  In addition to subprime mortgages, alt-A and jumbo loans (mortgages that are too large to be securitized by GSEs) are securitized through 
private-label RMBSs. The three categories are sometimes referred to as nonconforming loans because they do not meet accepted requirements 
for securitization in RMBSs issued by GSEs.
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Delinquency rates,* subprime ARMs (left scale)
Delinquency rates,* prime ARMs (left scale)
OFHEO Index, 4-quarter growth (right scale)
Mortgage Delinquency Rates and OFHEO 
House Price Index Changes
Figure 3  
Mortgage delinquency 
rates rise with cooling 
house prices
Sources:  
Office of Federal Housing 
Enterprise Oversight  
Mortgage Bankers Association * 60 days or more past due or in foreclosure 2007 Annual Report  •  The Subprime Mortgage Market
Figure 4  
Several Twelfth District 
MSAs have shown  
pronounced swings  
in house-price  
appreciation
Source: 
Office of Federal Housing 
Enterprise Oversight
for example, the link to the subprime market came 
not  through  direct  investment  in  subprime-related 
assets, but through their ties to the funding of those 
assets; in particular, the funding of CDOs was typi-
cally backed up with full liquidity facilities provided 
by large financial institutions.7 Sponsors of SIVs also 
provided  liquidity  back-ups  to  help  enhance  the 
credit rating of the SIVs. Additionally, both SIVs and 
CDOs obtained some funding through the issuance 
of commercial paper. Moreover, in the originate-to-
distribute model for subprime financing, commercial 
paper often was used to finance warehoused loans 
(temporary  financing  for  subprime  mortgages  be-
tween the time when mortgage loans are extended 
to borrowers and when they are packaged for sale 
in  the  secondary  market).  This  asset-backed  com-
mercial paper, which grew dramatically from 2003 
through mid-2007, was partially financed by money 
market mutual funds. 
Another issue is the difficulty in valuing complex 
structured  credits.  To  deal  with  the  complexity  of 
these instruments, many market participants, including 
financial institutions and other sophisticated investors, 
relied to a great extent on credit rating agencies for 
assessments of the risk. A very large share of the value 
of  structured  investments  originally  was  in  highly 
rated tranches (AAA or AA). These ratings led many 
investors to assume that the structured credits posed 
little risk.
Taken together, these developments created intri-
cately  entwined  exposures  to  the  subprime  market 
within the fabric of broader financial markets. While 
this helped support growth in the subprime market, 
the lack of transparency created by the layers of com-
plex financing made it difficult to assess the degree 
and incidence of risk among financial institutions and 
instruments. That lack of transparency was a key rea-
son the meltdown in the subprime market eventually 
led to such serious turmoil in financial markets more 
generally (see Box 3). 
The rise in mortgage delinquency rates
The originate-to-distribute model for financing sub-
prime debt worked well through the first part of this 
decade. At the end of 2005, delinquency rates were 
elevated in Gulf Coast state markets hit hard by Hur-
ricane Katrina and in Midwest markets that had experi-
enced subpar economic performance. Elsewhere, de-
spite the easing of credit standards discussed earlier,   
delinquency rates on subprime mortgages generally 
7  In 2006, the creation of credit default swaps tied to pools of subprime RMBSs provided yet another avenue for spreading risk in subprime debt.   
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2007Box 3: Financial market turmoil
The  market’s  assessment  of  risk  in  the  subprime 
market  began  to  change  in  response  to  information 
on the rise in subprime mortgage delinquencies in the 
second  half  of  2006  and  early  2007.  Nevertheless, 
despite the rise in delinquencies, the market appeared 
to retain confidence in highly rated tranches of subprime 
RMBSs  through  the  first  half  of  2007.  Moreover,  the 
originate-to-distribute financing of subprime and other 
nonconforming  mortgages  continued  to  function, 
though at a lower level. 
After June 2007, however, risk indicators for subprime 
RMBSs and related credit derivatives shot up. The trigger 
for the sudden shift in sentiment was the set of substantial 
rating downgrades on a number of highly rated tranches 
of subprime RMBSs. The downgrades raised concerns 
reaching far beyond the directly affected securities. The 
market became worried about the quality of rating agen-
cies’ evaluation of risk in other structured credits, includ-
ing  those  associated  with  nonconforming  mortgages, 
along with the risk associated with asset-backed com-
mercial paper. With uncertainty about risk exposures to 
subprime-related debt and more conservative liquidity 
management by banks, the interbank market for term 
loans was disrupted and experienced sharp increases in 
risk premiums. Market participants also appear to have 
reassessed financial risk more generally, as risk spreads 
improved from 2001 through 2005 (Figure 3). In fact, 
delinquency rates on risky subprime mortgages were 
remarkably low in a number of markets, including 
those in the Twelfth District (Figure 5). 
In  retrospect,  cracks  in  the  veneer  of  the  sub-
prime market were evident in late 2005, with serious 
problems becoming more obvious in the second half 
of 2006 (Figure 3). Overall, the deterioration in the   
performance of subprime loans was sudden, and it 
has  been  substantial.  The  changes  in  delinquency   
rates have been most pronounced in the markets in 
which  subprime  mortgage  performance  had  been   
remarkably  good.  This  is  especially  evident  in  the 
West. The Twelfth District has several of the metro-
politan statistical areas (MSAs) where subprime mort-
gage delinquency rates have moved from some of the 
lowest to some of the highest rates in the country 
(Figure 5).8
Among MSAs in the U.S., the median subprime   
delinquency  rate  in  the  markets  covered  by  the 
LoanPerformance data was 17.4 percent, with a range 
from about 7 to over 30 percent, as of September 
2007.9  Subprime  delinquency  rate  hotspots  include 
inland  areas  of  California  and  parts  of  Nevada, 
Florida, and Ohio. In the Twelfth District, the highest 
subprime  delinquency  rates  were  in  communities 
8  An MSA is a county-based area forming a central urban area. MSAs are defined by the Office of Management and Budget.
9  Source: FALP. “Delinquency” in this report is defined as being more 60 days or more past due or in foreclosure.
12  Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco 
increased on virtually all securities and credit, outside of 
the Treasury market. 
The result was a near seizing up of structured financ-
ing and a severe cutback in the securitization of non-
conforming  mortgages.  In  addition,  the  asset-backed 
commercial  paper  market  contracted  sharply,  forcing 
managers of many SIVs and CDOs to turn to back-up 
lines for liquidity. 
With  the  breakdown  in  funding,  firms  originating 
nonconforming mortgages were left holding loans and 
RMBSs that could not be sold into the market. In addi-
tion, some mortgage firms were forced to take back some 
loans that had defaulted soon after being securitized. The 
resulting funding squeeze put severe pressure on firms 
that  were  focused  on  residential  real  estate  financing, 
several of which failed. In a matter of months, some mort-
gage originators, such as New Century, fell from apparent 
profitability into Chapter 11 bankruptcy. 
Several financial institutions in the U.S. and abroad 
were  hit  with  sizable  losses  owing  to  their  exposures   
as  sponsors  of  SIVs  and  underwriters  of  other 
structured  credit,  as  well  as  their  direct  exposures  to   
subprime-related  debt.  Even  lesser-known  financial 
firms, such as Northern Rock in the U.K., were crippled 
by exposure to U.S. subprime debt; that institution was 
eventually taken over by the government.
 2007 Annual Report  •  The Subprime Mortgage Marketin the federal funds rate target at an unscheduled meeting 
on January 22, 2008. 
The actions by the Federal Reserve, along with the 
global “flight to safety” in which many financial market 
participants sought the safety of securities issued by the 
U.S. government, contributed to a sharp decline in interest 
rates on U.S. Treasury securities. However, the extent of 
the  net  stimulatory  effects  was  less  than  suggested  by 
the drop in “risk-free” Treasury rates. For private sector 
borrowers, the decline in risk-free rates was mitigated, 
and, in some cases, even offset by the tightening credit 
standards and lower tolerance for risk in financial markets. 
Prior to the turmoil, risk premiums on virtually all kinds of 
private sector debt were unusually low, and, as noted in 
this report, some credit standards were lenient, to say the 
least. However, amidst the market turmoil, interest rates 
on virtually all privately issued securities rose relative to 
yields on comparable maturity Treasury securities. Higher 
quality firms did see a net decline in the cost of credit, 
even with a rise in the risk premiums, though lower-grade 
corporate bonds with greater credit risk faced notably 
higher interest rates. Among households, rates on low-
risk conforming mortgages decreased on balance, while 
other mortgage rates rose, even for some borrowers with 
high credit ratings.
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Figure 5  
Subprime delinquency 
rates for many Twelfth 





The hits taken by monoline financial guarantors further 
spread the effects of the market turmoil. These companies 
guarantee the timely payment of principal and interest 
due on various types of securities, including structured 
credits. Losses at these firms affected their capital po-
sitions and brought into question their future ability to 
guarantee a wide range of securities, including those is-
sued by state and local governments.
Among portfolio lenders, such as commercial banks, 
these developments led to the rapid growth in assets rela-
tive to capital. Though the banking system overall entered 
this difficult period in a strong position, with concerns 
about further pressures on capitalization and more gen-
eral  deterioration  in  loan  quality,  banks  took  steps  to 
tighten credit terms and restrict availability on virtually 
all types of credit. 
In response to the market turmoil, the Federal Reserve 
System initiated several policy actions to forestall the ef-
fects of the financial market turmoil. These included large 
injections of reserves starting in early August 2007, mak-
ing discount window lending more accessible, and intro-
ducing the Term Auction Facility, which gives banks an-
other route besides the discount window to tap into the 
Fed’s lending function. The Federal Open Market Com-
mittee also took several actions to substantially ease the 
stance of monetary policy, including a 75-basis-point cut 
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 2007 Annual Report  •  The Subprime Mortgage Marketin California’s Central Valley, with Stockton ranking 
eighth  among  MSAs.  The  delinquency  rate  for  the 
Stockton area, for example, jumped from about 3.5 
percent at the end of 2005 to over 25 percent in late 
2007. Subprime delinquency rates were high in other 
Central Valley communities, especially the Modesto 
and Merced areas. In the Las Vegas and Phoenix areas, 
subprime delinquency rates reached 17.7 percent and 
12.7  percent,  respectively,  in  2007,  compared  with 
4 percent and 3.6 percent at the end of 2005. The 
Twelfth District also has some of the better performing 
markets, including parts of California, Arizona, and 
the Pacific Northwest. Delinquency rates on subprime 
loans moved up in Hawaii and Alaska, but were below 
the national average (Figure 6). The delinquency rate 
in the Salt Lake City, Utah, area, which changed little 
since 2005, also was below the national average. 
Within the Twelfth District, the combination of con-
centrations of subprime loans and poor performance 
of mortgage loans in some areas has led to some of 
the highest overall rates of mortgage foreclosure filings 
in the nation (Figure 7). In 2007, MSAs in California’s 
Central Valley were among the highest in the nation 
in terms of foreclosure filings relative to the number 
of households. Also high on the list were inland areas 
of Southern California and Las Vegas, Nevada. With 
these concentrations of foreclosures, Nevada ranked 
highest in the nation in terms of foreclosure filings 
compared to the number of households in 2007, and 
California ranked fourth. Outside of the Twelfth Dis-
trict, Florida and Michigan ranked second and third, 
respectively. Areas in the Twelfth District with more 
moderate foreclosure filing rates include MSAs in the 
Pacific Northwest, Alaska, and Hawaii. 
Economic Research  
Group Vice President Fred Furlong (second from left) and economists (left to right) Yelena Takhtamanova, 
Elizabeth Laderman, and John Krainer, from the Economic Research department, conduct in-depth research and 
analysis of economic, banking, and financial developments in the U.S. and Twelfth District. 
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Drivers of delinquency rates
The most important factor by far in explaining the 
regional  differences  in  subprime  delinquency  rates 
has been the change in house prices. As suggested 
by Figures 4 and 5, areas such as those in the Twelfth 
District with very rapid house-price appreciation in 
2004 and 2005 had extremely low subprime delin-
quencies at the end of 2005. The strong link between 
house-price appreciation and the performance of sub-
prime loans prior to the recent crisis is confirmed by 
more formal statistical analysis that controls for other 
factors such as economic conditions.10
Formal analysis also shows that, since the slump 
in housing in mid-2005, changes in house prices have 
been the most reliable indicator of subprime delin-
quency hotspots in the U.S. and the Twelfth District.11 
Figure 8 provides a graphical perspective on this link 
between  delinquency  rates  and  house-price  appre-
ciation. The figure covers the largest MSAs, highlight-
ing those in the Twelfth District, and shows a strong 
negative relationship between the past two years of 
house-price appreciation and subprime delinquency 
rates in 2007. 
As important as changes in house prices are in ex-
plaining the rise in delinquencies, they are not the 
only factors. Research finds that, in recent years, em-
ployment conditions and indicators of borrower risk, 
such as FICO scores, also help explain regional dif-
ferences in mortgage delinquency rates.12 For exam-
ple, weakness in job markets helped account for the   
higher levels of delinquency rates for metro areas such 
as Cleveland and Detroit, or cities in the Gulf Coast 
states still recovering from Hurricane Katrina. Studies 
also find that measures of loan risk, such as loan-to-
value ratios, are related to the probability a borrower 
will default on a mortgage loan. 
Researchers have examined whether a sudden de-
terioration in underwriting standards might account 
for  the  abrupt  deterioration  in  the  performance  of 
subprime mortgage loans in recent years. One study 
10  See Mark Doms, Frederick Furlong, and John Krainer, “Subprime Mortgage Delinquency Rates,” Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco, 
Working Paper 2007-33 (2007). www.frbsf.org/publications/economics/papers/2007/wp07-33bk.pdf
11  The analysis also shows that the deceleration in house prices since 2005 is highly correlated with the change in subprime delinquency 
rates among MSAs.
12  See, for example, Doms, Furlong, and Krainer, “Subprime Mortgage Delinquency Rates” (2007).
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Figure 6   Parts of the Twelfth District exhibit exceptionally high rates of subprime delinquencies
Subprime Delinquency Rates* among MSAs (2007:Q3)
19.2 to 28.35    17.25 to 19.2      15.48 to 17.25        13.55 to 15.48     6.88 to 13.55
Subprime Delinquency Rate (2007:Q3 Percent) 
Source: First American LoanPerformance
* 60 days or more past due or in foreclosure16  Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco 
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finds that, during the explosive growth of the sub-
prime market from 2001 to 2006, the quality of loans 
deteriorated relatively steadily as underwriting criteria 
eased.13 That work suggests that declining underwrit-
ing standards played a role by increasing the overall 
riskiness of the pool of subprime borrowers, but the 
effects were not evident until after house prices soft-
ened. One factor that does not appear to have had 
a significant direct role in triggering defaults on sub-
prime mortgages in 2006 and 2007 are interest rate 
resets on subprime ARMs. As indicated earlier, origi-
nations of the vast majority of outstanding subprime 
loans took place since 2005, and only a fraction hit 
reset dates as of late 2007. 
Overall, then, the key finding of most research on 
the issue of the performance of subprime loans in 
recent years is that house prices matter.14 This can be 
the case even though it is assumed that the common 
triggers for mortgage delinquencies and defaults are 
life events such as job loss, illness, or divorce—which 
disrupt the borrower’s ability to repay a mortgage. 
Changes in house prices can be expected to affect the 
sensitivity of borrowers to such life events by influ-
encing the ability and willingness of homeowners to 
keep current on their mortgage payments. In a mar-
ket in which house prices have been stagnant or even 
declining, a borrower with a recent mortgage secured 
with little or no down payment would not have the 
flexibility to tap equity in the house to weather a 
life event. Likewise, if a borrower was counting on 
house-price appreciation in order to refinance into a 
more affordable loan, low or no appreciation would 
foil these plans. This could leave the borrower with 
a mortgage that is unaffordable on a permanent ba-
sis.  Alternatively,  this  hypothetical  borrower  might   
even be able to afford the loan but still be unwill-
ing to make the payments if the borrower thought   
house-price appreciation would remain low or even 
be negative going forward. This latter scenario would 
view  borrowers—even  those  borrowers  for  whom 
13  See Yuliya Demyanyk and Otto van Hemert, “Understanding the Subprime Mortgage Crisis,” Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, manu-
script (February 4, 2008). http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1020396
14   A particularly important study is: Kristopher Gerardi, Adam Hale Shapiro, and Paul S. Willen, “Subprime Outcomes: Risky Mortgages, 
Homeownership Experiences, and Foreclosures,” Federal Reserve Bank of Boston, Working Paper 07-15 (2007). They conclude that house 
prices have been the main drivers of the rise in foreclosures. This paper provides an assessment of the homeownership experiences in 
Massachusetts from 1989 to 2007. www.bos.frb.org/economic/wp/wp2007/wp0715.htm
Figure 7   Forclosure rates in the Twelfth District are highest in areas of subprime concentration
Mortgage Foreclosure Filings as a Percent of Households for MSAs (2007)
Foreclosure Filings as a Percent of Total Households (2007) 
1.93 to 100  0.946 to 1.93  0.625 to 0.946  0.273 to 0.625  0.01065 to 0.273
Source: RealtyTracFederal Reserve Bank of San Francisco  17
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the loan is for their primary residences—as real estate 
speculators, in part. If house prices are not expected 
to rise as before, some borrowers may conclude that 
they own too much house, and demand will fall. 
To the extent that the subprime meltdown is tied 
to the overall slump in housing, other borrowers also 
should be affected. Indeed, many of the same con-
clusions just cited apply to prime and alt-A mortgage 
delinquencies  as  well.  While  default  rates  for  alt-A 
and prime loans are lower than for subprime loans, 
delinquency and foreclosure rates among all catego-
ries across regions of the country are highly correlated. 
More formal statistical analysis confirms that differences 
in house-price appreciation account for most of the 
regional differences in delinquency and foreclosure 
rates, whether for prime or nonprime borrowers.
Conclusion
The meltdown in the subprime mortgage market 
in large part reflects the more general housing down-
turn and decline in the demand for housing. With the 
cover of rapidly rising house prices removed, the vul-
nerability and underlying riskiness of subprime lend-
ing has been revealed. That vulnerability is especially 
notable, given the way that delinquency rates have 
Figure 8  
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shot up, even though a very large share of subprime 
borrowers have yet to face interest rate resets. Going 
forward, the potential effects of interest rate resets 
will depend, in part, on movement in the various in-
dexes used to set mortgage rates on subprime ARMs. 
At the same time, to the extent that the decline in 
house prices continues to be the main predictor of 
mortgage defaults, and housing continues to slump, 
default rates could very well continue to rise. 
As far as capital markets are concerned, the melt-
down in the subprime market is likely to have lon-
ger-term effects on the financing of mortgages and 
other credit. The problems in the subprime market 
not only affect securitization of subprime mortgages, 
but also securitization of jumbo loans and alt-A mort-
gages.15 For securitization of nonconforming loans to 
rebound, the implementation of the originate-to-dis-
tribute model will have to be changed. Investors also 
will need to develop better tools for evaluating and 
pricing the risk of structured credits. Even with such 
changes, the cost of credit is likely to be higher going 
forward, and credit financing will perhaps be charac-
terized by a different balance between securitization 
and traditional portfolio-based lending than observed 
at the height of the subprime boom. 
15   The economic stimulus package passed by Congress in February 2008 raises the limit on the maximum size of conforming loans for six 
months (July through December 2008), which would be expected to boost temporarily the securitization of more jumbo mortgage loans. 
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